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20 May 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Intelligence as a Force Multiplier--Meeting with Lieutenant General Sidney Weinstein, Army ACSI, 19 May 1986

1. [redacted] and I met with Weinstein in his Pentagon office. Steve briefed the current activities of the CIPC. I provided background on the force multiplier study and mentioned that General Nichols, NIO/GPF, suggested that I contact Weinstein to get his views on how the study might be structured. Jim Davis, Weinstein's assistant, attended the meeting. 25X1

2. General Weinstein said that there are a lot "games" and "models" that can be used to demonstrate the value of intelligence. One game involves making intelligence available to only one of the two sides in a conflict. The results permit an evaluatiuon of the value of the intelligence on the basis of the forces that are left over on each side after the conflict. Beyond the tactical level, such games can be played at the strategic level in situations involving either a lot of intelligence or no intelligence. This permits one to demonstrate the value of particular intelligence systems. Weinstein thought it was easier to to do gaming at the strategic level because it is "cleaner" than the multitude of unknowns that characterize tactical-level operations.

3. Weinstein volunteered to "broker" a visit for us to the 18th Airborne Corps at Fort Bragg [redacted] 25X1
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[redacted] He said that if the visit were to take place during an exercise, 25X1
this dependency easily would be seen on the basis of the number of message items alone. (The prospective visit came up in the context of Weinstein's description of the Army's intelligence "fusion" efforts that he said take place at every echelon.)

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4. On the subject of intelligence support to contingency operations, Weinstein said that the problem was "historical" involving procedures and communications, not the amount of available information. Personnel in the field don't understand the national systems and what they have to offer. The systems are not "optimized" for anything but confusion. There is the "rat in the rathole" problem--the challenge is to understand where the other "rats" are and what they're doing, i.e., how to access intelligence that might be available. Mechanisms are needed for getting intelligence to the field users given the unfortunate tendency these days to deny intelligence to the guy in the field. Weinstein saw no lessened need for the intelligence officers to "lean forward in the intelligence foxhole" as soon as a planned military operation becomes known to the military units that will be used.

5. As we took our leave I suggested that Weinstein could provide any further thoughts through his representative on the working group for the multiplier study, Major Joe Tullbane. Weinstein asked Davis to arrange a meeting for him with Tullbane on the subject.

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